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THE RECENT  BURST of  inflation  in the  American  economy  has  made  the 
problem of reconciling full employment with price stability all the more 
difficult.  While few doubt that a sufficiently  long period of high unemploy- 
ment will eventually dampen inflation, many fear the social consequences 
of this unemployment. Not  only would the losses in national income be 
large, but also they could be concentrated among the low- and middle- 
income families who can least afford them. 
Whether or not macroeconomic policy can permanently alter the rate 
of unemployment, it is important to  understand how its  losses are dis- 
tributed. If there is a stable long-run tradeoff between reducing inflation 
and reducing involuntary unemployment, macroeconomic decisions on the 
direction of the economy will in large part depend on the relative costs and 
benefits of  achieving each  objective. Any  impact  that  inflation or  un- 
employment has on the distribution of income should be a major factor 
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in these calculations. But even if a stable long-run tradeoff does not exist, 
policymakers  must remain aware of the distributional effects of unemploy- 
ment so that those income groups who generally bear these costs might be 
compensated for the sacrifices they make for the good of the nation. 
Previous attempts to  measure the  costs  of  high unemployment have 
focused on the direct loss of output resulting from a slack economy, esti- 
mated by Arthur Okun and others as approximately 3 percent for every 
percentage-point reduction in  employment.1 Robert  Gordon  finds this 
estimate to  be greatly overstated for the long run if temporary cyclical 
advances in labor productivity are not sustainable, and even more so if 
allowance is made for the increased social value of time devoted to non- 
market activity.2 Whether or not Gordon's adjustments are appropriate, 
both sets of calculations ignore the fact that the burden of unemployment is 
not evenly shared. If the burden were borne proportionately by all workers, 
or if it could easily be offset, equity considerations might be ignored in 
policymaking. But if the burden falls mainly on low-income workers, who 
have enough labor market difficulties even in prosperous times, the true 
cost of unemployment could be much greater than is suggested by calcula- 
tions based on the loss of aggregate output and the value of leisure time. 
Higher overall unemployment imposes two types of distributional costs. 
The first is the "direct" loss in earned income due to the unemployment of 
family heads, losses in hours worked by those who remain employed, and 
losses in the earnings of secondary workers. Even if these losses were con- 
centrated among certain groups of workers, they could be offset by in- 
creases in government transfer benefits; but the present transfer system 
appears to  fall well short of this objective. And  apart from any actual 
shortcomings of the present transfer system, there is also an intrinsic limit 
to the degree  to which the nation can rely on transfers  for protection against 
1. See Arthur M. Okun, "Potential GNP: Its Measurement  and Significance,"  in 
American  Statistical  Association,  Proceedings  of the Business  and Economics  Statistics 
Section (1962), pp. 98-104, reprinted  in Okun, The Political Economy of Prosperity 
(Brookings  Institution,  1970),  Appendix;  and George  L. Perry,  "Labor  Force Structure, 
Potential Output,  and Productivity,"  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity  (3:1971), 
pp. 533-65 (hereafter  this document  is referred  to as BPEA, followed by the date); and 
Benjamin  M. Friedman  and Michael  L. Wachter,  "Unemployment:  Okun's  Law, Labor 
Force and Productivity,"  Review of Economics  and Statistics, Vol. 56 (May 1974), 
pp. 167-76. 
2. See Robert J. Gordon, "The Welfare Cost of Higher Unemployment,"  BPEA 
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cyclical losses in income. As  benefit schedules under transfer programs 
become more and more generous, workers have a growing incentive to rely 
on the transfer  system, thus leading to further  reductions in earned income. 
Feldstein has recently raised this issue in his criticism of the present un- 
employment insurance system,3 and the very same argument has been the 
great stumbling block  thus far preventing passage of  a  comprehensive 
income-support program for  low-income  families  with  male  heads.  A 
movement toward higher overall unemployment might make the adoption 
of such a program even less likely if the decline in labor demand hinders 
low-income  workers in  getting steady jobs,  raises the  cost  of  a  given 
transfer program, and poses greater problems in administering the work 
requirements  or inducements that such a plan may contain. 
The second distributional  cost of high unemployment involves the quality 
of the jobs that are available to workers who may also suffer from racial, 
sexual,  or ethnic discrimination. Beginning with  Doeringer  and  Piore, 
many writers have suggested that labor markets may contain a certain 
amount of segmentation, with "internal"  jobs featuring high pay and good 
opportunities for  long-run advancement and  "external" jobs  featuring 
neither and hence characterized  by rapid turnover and little accumulation 
of on-the-job human capital.4 An extension of these segmentation theories 
suggests that changes in the quantity of employment in the economy could 
be accompanied by other changes in the labor market that alter the quality 
of the employment opportunities available to  poor  and underprivileged 
workers. Many more of these good jobs  should be available when total 
employment opportunities  are greater  and when employers have more diffi- 
culty in filling vacancies. If this is the case, the reduction in good job oppor- 
3. See Martin  S. Feldstein,  Lowering  the  Permanent  Rate of Unemployment,  A Study 
for the Joint Economic  Committee,  93 Cong. 1 sess. (1973), and Feldstein,  "The Eco- 
nomics of the New Unemployment,"  Public  Interest,  No. 33 (Fall 1973),  pp. 3-42. 
4. Several  bookshelves  have  now been  written  on this topic. Probably  the most widely 
read statement  of the hypothesis  is Peter B. Doeringer  and Michael J. Piore, Internal 
Labor Markets and Mantpower  Analysis  (Heath,  1971). Other references are  David  M. 
Gordon, Theories  of Poverty  and Underemploymenit:  Orthodox,  Radical,  and Dual Labor 
Market  Perspectives  (Heath,  1972);  Robert  E. Hall, "Why  Is the Unemployment  Rate So 
High at Full Employment?"  BPEA  (3:1970), pp. 369-402; Bennett  Harrison,  "Education 
and Underemployment  in the Urban Ghetto," American Economic  Review, Vol. 62 
(December  1972),  pp. 796-812; and Howard  M. Wachtel  and Charles  Betsey,  "Employ- 
ment at Low Wages," Review  of Economics  and Statistics, Vol. 54 (May 1972), pp. 
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tunities is a second distributional cost of higher unemployment-possibly 
very significant  in the long run.5 
This paper focuses on the direct costs, in particular  on their incidence by 
income class. It first attempts to  measure the earnings losses  of  family 
heads caused by  higher cyclical  unemployment,  arrayed according  to 
family type, race, and a proxy for permanent income. The paper then in- 
vestigates the indirect changes in earnings associated with higher overall 
unemployment through changes in hours worked of family heads and the 
earnings  of wives, children, and others in the family. Finally, it assesses the 
income protection afforded by various types of  transfer payments-un- 
employment insurance, welfare, food stamps, the portion of social security 
not going to the aged, and some other, mainly private, transfers-again 
distinguishing among income groups and family types. In concentrating 
on the changes in family income arising from these sources, the paper 
ignores the distributional effects of depressed wage rates in an economic 
climate that does not  offer as many good jobs,  of changes in property 
income associated with shifts in economic activity, and of  unanticipated 
inflation. These are important topics,  but each raises a different set of 
substantive issues and is best left to another paper. 
Investigating  the Distributional  Impacts of Business Cycles 
Despite the intrinsic  microeconomic character of the income-distribution 
question, most previous studies of the impact of higher unemployment on 
lower-income people have used aggregations of individual household data. 
One approach, employed first by the Council of Economic Advisers and 
later by Gallaway, Aaron, Hollister and Palmer, and Thurow, is to regress 
the overall size of the "poverty population" or components of it on various 
measures of economic growth, cyclical indicators, and other independent 
variables that differ according to  the  purposes of  the  investigator.6 A 
5. The most systematic  discussion of this issue can be found in Arthur M.  Okun, 
"Upward  Mobility  in a High-pressure  Economy,"  BPEA (1:1973), pp. 207-52. 
6. See  Economic  Report  of the  President  Together  with  the  Annual  Report  of the  Council 
of Economic  Advisers,  January  1964,  p. 60; Lowell  E. Gallaway,  "The  Foundations  of the 
'War on Poverty,"'  American  Economic  Review, Vol. 55 (March 1965), pp. 122-31; 
Henry Aaron, "The Foundations of the 'War on Poverty' Reexamined,"  American 
Economic  Review,  Vol. 57 (December 1967), pp. 1229-40; Robinson G. Hollister and 
John L. Palmer,  "The Impact of Inflation  on the Poor," in Kenneth E. Boulding  and 
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second approach, used first by Schultz and then by Thurow, Metcalf, and 
Mirer, is to relate factor shares or parameters  reflecting the entire distribu- 
tion of income to a similar set of variables, and from that to determine  how 
outside forces affect incomes at various levels.7 Such studies usually find an 
adverse impact of the business cycle on the distribution of income, with a 
permanently  higher unemployment  rate worsening the situation of the poor, 
at least as compared with middle-income groups. According to their results, 
a reduction of 1 percentage point in the unemployment rate lifts nearly as 
many people out of poverty (defined in terms of absolute needs) as would 
one year of economic growth. 
While these studies are useful, they still leave much to be desired. First, 
the poverty regressions describe only one small part of the income distri- 
bution, that  area just  below  and just  above  the  government's poverty 
standard. Any change in status, no matter how small, is considered desir- 
able if it moves people across the magic line; while even large changes in 
status that do not move people across the line are ignored. Second, while 
"reduced  form" descriptions of the income distribution sometimes fit very 
well, they do not always give internally consistent results and they never 
tell much about the underlying  process-why  a recession increases  the num- 
ber of poor people, whether transfer programs are effective in protecting 
against cyclical losses, whether the poverty program was effective in reduc- 
ing the number of low-income people. Finally, all studies based on income 
aggregations  necessarily suffer  from the fact that the data measure only the 
income reported by a certain group in a certain calendar year, and from 
their inability to follow the movements-if  any-of  given families among 
Income  Distribution  (Wadsworth,  1972);  and Lester  C. Thurow,  Poverty  and Discrimina- 
tion (Brookings  Institution,  1969). In these studies the poverty population  is measured 
according  to the government's  "absolute  needs"  standard,  described  in Mollie  Orshansky, 
"Counting  the Poor: Another Look at the Poverty Profile," Social Security Bulletin, 
Vol. 28 (January  1965), pp. 3-29. Up-to-date poverty  thresholds  adjusted  for inflation 
are given in the Census Bureau's  Current  Population  Reports,  "Characteristics  of the 
Low-Income  Population,"  Series  P-60. 
7. T. Paul Schultz,  "Secular  Trends  and Cyclical  Behavior  of Income Distribution  in 
the United  States:  1944-1965,"  in Lee Soltow (ed.), Six Papers  on thle  Size Distribution  of 
Wealth  and Income  (Columbia  University  Press for the National Bureau  of Economic 
Research,  1969); Lester  C. Thurow, "Analyzing  the American  Income Distribution," 
in American  Economic  Association,  Papers  and  Proceedings  of the  Eighty-second  Annual 
Meeting,  1969 (American  Economic  Review,  Vol. 60, May 1970), pp. 261-69; Charles  E. 
Metcalf,  An Econometric  Model  of the  Income  Distribution  (Markham,  1972);  and Thad 
W. Mirer,  "The  Effects  of Macroeconomic  Fluctuations  on the Distribution  of Income," 
Review  of Income  and Wealth,  Series 19, No. 4 (December  1973), pp. 385-405. 298  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1974 
income  classes  from one year  to the next.8  Two questions  arise:  Is a year 
long enough  to measure  economic  status  appropriately  if there  is a large 
transitory  component  to family income?  And, more generally,  is it ap- 
propriate  to predict  what  will happen  to people  over  time on the basis of 
cross-section  data? 
In this paper  I try to improve  on past work through  the use of longi- 
tudinal  data.  These  data  come  from  the Panel  Study  of Income  Dynamics,  a 
study  of 4,800  families  and  unrelated  individuals  under  the auspices  first  of 
the  Office  of Economic  Opportunity  and  now of the Department  of Health, 
Education,  and Welfare,  conducted  by the Survey  Research  Center  of the 
University  of Michigan.  The larger  portion of the sample,  2,930 family 
units,  was selected  from a representative  national  cross-section;  the rest, 
1,870  units,  came from a sample  of low-income  households  identified  for 
the 1966 Survey  of Economic  Opportunity.  All family heads have been 
interviewed  every  spring  since 1968  (the data for 1974  were  not yet avail- 
able at this writing).  They were asked  a wide variety  of questions  about 
their labor market  experience,  income, demographic  characteristics,  and 
attitudes.  While the survey  did include questions  about the income and 
employment  patterns  of others in the family unit, information  on this 
score  is much  less complete.  The first  five interviews  were  conducted  per- 
sonally  with  the family  head,  but subsequent  interviews  have  been by tele- 
phone with an abbreviated  questionnaire.  Most of the questions  in the 
survey  involve  recall:  that  is, in the spring  of year  t the family  head  is asked 
about income, hours worked, hours unemployed,  and so on, for year 
t -  1.9 This is very similar  to the way the Current  Population  Survey 
8. To be more  precise,  the Current  Population  Survey  (CPS)  of the U.S. Bureau  of the 
Census  samples  households  for four  months  in a row, then drops  them  for eight  months, 
and then resamples  for another  four. The income questions  from which distributional 
statistics  are compiled  are asked once each year, in the March  CPS, which means that 
every  rotation  group  represented  in March  of any year  will also be represented  in March 
a year previously  or subsequently.  The published  tabulations  do not give this longitu- 
dinal information,  however;  it is available  only on census tapes and is extremely  costly 
to obtain. One person who managed to do so is Terence F. Kelly; see his "Factors 
Affecting  Poverty:  A Gross Flow Analysis,"  in The  President's  Commission  on Income 
Maintenance  Programs:  Technical  Studies  (1970), pp. 1-81. 
9. General  descriptions  of the study can be found in James N. Morgan and others, 
Five  Thousand  American  Families-Patterns  of Econzomic  Progress,  Vol. 1: An Analysis  of 
the First  Five Years  of the  Panel  Study  of Income  Dynamics,  and Vol. 2 (edited  by James 
N. Morgan):  Special  Studies  of the  First  Five Years  of the  Panel  Study  of Income  Dynamics 
(University  of Michigan,  Institute  for Social Research,  1974);  and U.S. Department  of 
Health, Education,  and Welfare,  "The Changing  Economic Status of 5000 American 
Families:  Highlights  from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics"  (1974; processed). Edward M. Gramlich  299 
(CPS)  measures  annual  income,  but the resulting  information  would  prob- 
ably be less precise  than the labor force-employment  statistics  developed 
from  that survey,  which  are  based  on answers  regarding  the previous  week 
or month.'0 
The panel data will be used, generally  by pooling time-series  data for 
each family, to estimate  equations  explaining  four aspects of cyclical 
income  losses:  (1) the  direct  loss  from  increases  in the  hours  unemployed  of 
family  heads;  (2) any additional  losses of hours  worked  by family  heads; 
(3) any losses in labor  income  of secondary  workers  in the family  unit;" 
and (4) any increase  in benefits  from transfer  programs  that follows the 
loss in earned  income. 
This decomposition  of the overall  responses  provides  a means  of seeing 
why the overall  reduced-form  relationships  come out the way they do, of 
making  more  precise  tests of the impact  of policy  changes  on the various 
reactions,  and  of checking  the responses  for consistency  with  other  work  at 
various  stages. 
The advantage  of using  this body of data in such a way is obvious.  If 
someone  were  to ask  a scientist  to estimate  the effects  of cyclical  unemploy- 
ment,  he would  no doubt  recommend  selecting  a sample  weighted  accord- 
ing to the interests  of the investigator,  and observing  these people first  in 
good times and then in bad. This is essentially  what the Michigan  longi- 
tudinal  survey  did (though  there  is no suggestion  that the real reason  for 
the period  of higher  unemployment  beginning  in 1970  was to increase  the 
richness  of ongoing  longitudinal  surveys). 
But  this  longitudinal  technique  also has disadvantages.  First,  it is simply 
impossible  to follow all people in a carefully  designed  sample  over time. 
Some cannot be followed  because  they do not return  questionnaires,  a 
phenomenon  known  as sample  attrition;  others  experience  so many  com- 
10. The one set of labor force statistics  not based on answers  regarding  the previous 
week or month is the annual BLS work experience  survey, which counts those who 
worked or were unemployed  at any time during the previous year and is inevitably 
retrospective.  See Anne M. Young, "Work Experience  of the Population in  1972," 
Monthly  Labor  Review,  Vol. 97 (February  1974), pp. 48-55; or Manpower  Report  of the 
President,  April 1974, Table B-18, p. 310. Arthur  Okun calculates  that any understate- 
ment due to the retrospective  nature  of the survey  is less than might be supposed; he 
arrived  at this conclusion  by blowing  up the frequency  distribution  on the basis of class 
midpoints  and arriving  at numbers  that are very  close to the total amount of unemploy- 
ment experienced  in a year. The retrospective  survey  does, however,  report  fewer spells 
of unemployment  and longer  average  durations  than do the monthly  statistics. 
11. Women in male-female  families will be called secondary earners, not out of 
chauvinism,  but because  on average  they work less than the male. 300  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1974 
plicated changes in family structure that  one is  in effect observing the 
behavior of different people every year. In the panel study, for example, 
overall attrition rates were 11 percent in the first year and 3 percent or less 
in all succeeding years. These numbers seem fairly small-particularly  in 
view of the fact that interviewers  were trying to follow divorced husbands 
and wives and even children who split off to form their own families; but 
even such small rates of attrition whittled the sample for which there were 
six years of continuous data from the 4,800 initial households to  3,800.12 
Eliminating those  households  where the  head's  identity changed  (say, 
because of a divorce or remarriage), or where the head was not  usually 
in the labor force, lowers the number further to just  over 2,600. If  at- 
trition or change in  family  structure were uncorrelated with the  pro- 
pensity to undergo unemployment, the 2,600 households could be viewed 
as a random sample of the 4,800 and any results based on the survey would 
be unbiased. But it is probably more realistic to expect that both types of 
attrition will eliminate from the sample proportionately more workers who 
are highly prone to unemployment, and thus lead to some understatement 
of the cyclical sensitivity of unemployment of certain types of families.13 
A second disadvantage with these panel data is that they cover only one 
period of low unemployment, 1967-69, and one period of high unemploy- 
ment,  1970-72. This span may differ from others of  low  and high  un- 
employment for many reasons: the Vietnam war may have distorted the 
labor market behavior of teenagers; the 1970 recession may have hit highly 
educated scientists unusually hard; major policy changes were made in 
many  important transfer programs over  this  period.  These  influences 
suggest caution in interpreting  the results of one particular  six-year period. 
But I have tried to guard against the most egregious difficulties by fitting 
certain basic unemployment relationships over a longer, fifteen-year, span 
to eliminate any atypical effects of the 1967-72 period, and by  fitting the 
12. The numbers  given  in the panel study  reports  cited above are misleading  for these 
purposes  because  whenever  they trace a split-off, they add the family to  the sample. 
Thus while their sample seems to expand with time, the sample for which six years of 
continuous  data exist has shrunk. 
13. An indication  that  attrition  may not lead  to serious  biases  comes  from  the response 
rates  in the first  year.  Almost one-quarter  of those initially  selected  for the sample  did not 
respond  to or were  not located for the first  interview.  Remarkably,  however,  these non- 
response  proportions  were  almost  exactly  the same  in the national  portion  of the sample 
and in the low-income  (and presumably  high-unemployment)  portion. Whatever  leads 
to nonresponse,  then,  may not be regularly  related  to income or the propensity  to under- 
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transfer  relationships only for 1971, after most of the policy changes were 
made, so as to describe the way these programs operate at the present time. 
The Incidence  of Cyclical Unemployment 
The first question regarding the distributional impact of swings in busi- 
ness activity involves  the  incidence  of  cyclical  unemployment. In  this 
section I investigate this question through regressions relating the cyclical 
incidence to the personal and geographical attributes of family heads. 
Previous studies of unemployment have been based either on time-series 
or cross-section data. The time-series studies have used aggregate labor 
force data to explain participation and unemployment rates for different 
demographic classes of workers.14  In terms of percentage-point changes, 
they have found great cyclical volatility in unemployment rates for youths 
and blacks, much less in rates for mature men, and some in the employment 
rate, but not in the unemployment rate, for adult women (because labor 
force participation rates also change). Analysis of  time-series data also 
indicates that the unemployment rates of those with little education and in 
low- or middle-class occupations show greater cyclical sensitivity than do 
the rates for workers who have the responsibility of supporting a family.15 
Hall has made an attempt to use cross-section household data to explain 
amounts of unemployment undergone by urban workers of various types.16 
He found that after he controlled for family position, age, and city of resi- 
dence, which studies based on time-series data cannot easily do, unemploy- 
14. See, for example, George L. Perry, "Unemployment  Flows in the U.S. Labor 
Market,"  BPEA  (2:1972),  p. 259; and  Paul  M. Ryscavage,  "Impact  of Higher  Unemploy- 
ment on Major Labor Force Groups," Monthlly  Labor  Review,  Vol. 93 (March 1970), 
pp. 21-25. 
15. This evidence  is reviewed  in Robert  Aaron Gordon, The  Goal  of Full  Employment 
(Wiley, 1967),  Chap.  6; and Robert  M. Solow, The  Nature  and  Sources  of Unemployment 
in the United  States (Uppsala,  Sweden:  Almqvist & Wiksell, 1964). 
16. See Robert E. Hall,  "Why Is the Unemployment  Rate So High?" Appendix, 
pp. 397-402. A much more elaborate  simulation  model describing  monthly transition 
probabilities  between  employment,  unemployment,  and lack of participation  in the labor 
force using CPS data is now under  construction  at the Urban Institute.  A preliminary 
write-up  of this model and its simLilation  results  can be found in Ralph E. Smith, "A 
Simulation  Model of the Demographic  Composition  of Employment,  Unemployment, 
and Labor  Force Participation:  Status  Report,"  Working  Paper  350-65  (Urban  Institute, 
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ment was negatively  related to family income. Since his results pertained to 
the single boom year of  1966, however, there is a question whether the 
family's income was low because its unemployment was high, and also 
whether the results would hold in periods of higher overall unemployment. 
Here I try to gain the advantages of both ways of looking at unemploy- 
ment, by using mixed time-series and cross-section estimation. I have first 
estimated very simple time-series relationships using aggregate Bureau of 
Labor Statistics data for close proxies of the unemployment rates for the 
major types of family heads-adult  white males; adult nonwhite males; and 
widowed, divorced, and separated females. These relationships determine 
how group unemployment rates are related to the overall rate. Then I have 
used the panel study data from the Michigan Survey Research Center to 
determine  how the unemployment of individual family heads is related to- 
or, really, allocated within-the  unemployment of their respective groups 
according to  variables such  as  education,  occupation,  wage rates, and 
location. The latter equations also average out any special influences of 
periods of abnormally low or high demand for labor on this within-group 
allocation because they are based on pooled time-series-cross-section data 
over the entire six-year period of the panel study. 
GROUP  UNEMPLOYMENT  RATES 
The first step is to relate the unemployment rates for the three major 
categories of family heads to the overall national aggregate rate by very 
simple "bridge" equations. The equations are fitted to annual time-series 
observations over the  1959-73 period, with a time trend to  capture the 
influence of secular changes in the composition of the population and in the 
desire to participate in the labor force. 
The coefficients, presented in Table 1, reach standard conclusions. As 
contrasted with the overall aggregate rate, which depends to an increasing 
degree on rates for teenagers and women who are not family heads, all the 
unemployment rates for  family  heads  decline  over  time-by  about  1 
percentage point over the fifteen-year period for adult white males, one- 
third of a point for females, and 5 points for blacks. The last coefficient 
reflects the sharp reduction in the unemployment rates for black males in 
the prime-age groups over the period-from  9.7 percent in 1959 when the 
national rate was 5.5 percent to 5.1 percent in 1972 when the national rate 
was 5.6 percent. It is undoubtedly related to declines in labor force partici- Edward M. Gramlich  303 
Table 1.  Coefficients  and Statistics for Unemployment  Rates (Ug) for 
Groups  by Characteristics  of Family  Head,  Annual  Observations,  1959_73a 
Dependent  variable:  group  unemployment  rate  (Ug)b 
Adult  females, 
widowed, 
Independent  variable  and  White  males,  Black males,  divorced, 
summary  statistic  25-54  25-54  separated 
Independent  variable 
Constant  -0.6291  (3.2)  0.3796 (0.5)  1.0805 (2.3) 
Time(  -0.0609  (8.4)  -0.3531  (13.5)  -0.0199(1.2) 
Aggregate  unemployment 
rate (U)b  0.7781 (22.9)  1.7330 (14.1)  0.9581 (12.1) 
Summary  statistic 
R2  0.986  0.980  0.937 
Standard  error  0.114  0.412  0.264 
Durbin-Watson  statistic  1.540  1.420  0.775 
Sources: Regression results using data from Manpower  Report of the President, April 1974. Unemploy- 
ment rates for males are averages  for age groups 25-34, 35-44, and 45-54, from Table A-16, and for females, 
from Table A-19. 
a.  The numbers in parentheses  are t-ratios. 
b.  All unemployment rates are expressed in percentage terms. 
c.  1959 =  1, 1960 = 2,...,  1973 =  15. 
pation  rates  for prime-age  black  males  of about  the same  magnitude.  White 
male  heads  continually  experience  a larger  share  of cyclical  unemployment 
than  they  do of the  frictional  unemployment  existing  at full employment,  as 
reflected  in the negative  intercept.  Black males did not exhibit such a 
relationship  at the outset  of the  period,  but  do now,  as the  trend  term  makes 
the intercept  negative  in recent  years.  The  relationship  for female  heads  has 
always had a positive  intercept,  however,  indicating  that their share of 
cyclical  unemployment  is less  than  their  share  of  frictional  unemployment.'7 
Finally,  the  important  coefficients  here,  a Ug/l U (Ug  is the group  unemploy- 
ment rate, U the aggregate  rate)  are 0.78 for white male heads, 1.73 for 
black male heads,  and 0.96 for female  heads. 
INDIVIDUAL UNEMPLOYMENT  RATES 
The  next step  is to allocate  this group  unemployment  among  individuals 
on the basis of the Michigan  panel  study  data.  These  equations  are  pooled 
17. Perry,  "Unemployment  Flows,"  p. 259, presents  results  for overall  male  and female 
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time-series-cross-section  relationships  for six years-1967 through  1972- 
for those  family  heads  for whom there  were  six years  of continuous  data 
and  who  were  in the  labor  force  (whether  employed  or unemployed)  in four 
of the six years.  The gross  sample  size is still quite  large  after  these  exclu- 
sions-1,503 white  male working  family  heads  (or 9,018 pooled observa- 
tions),  658 nonwhite  male  working  family  heads  (3,948  observations),  and 
471 female working family heads (2,826 observations).  However, as 
mentioned  above,  the exclusions  raise  the possibility  that  the total amount 
of unemployment  suffered  by family heads will be understated  if those 
omitted  from  the regression  because  of their  less stable  behavior  undergo 
disproportionate  amounts of  unemployment.  This understatement  is 
noticeable  but small  (as explored  further  below). 
The dependent  variable  in these regressions  is the proportion  of hours 
spent  unemployed  by an individual  deflated  by the group  unemployment 
rate  for that  year-call it Ui/Ug for the ith  family  head  in the group.  Hours 
unemployed  came from the survey:  Respondents  were asked  to give the 
number  of days  they  spent  unemployed  and  looking  for work,  temporarily 
laid off, or in involuntary  part-time  employment  in the previous  year. 
These  answers  were  then divided  by 260 to convert  them to a fraction  of 
total  working  days-or  equivalently,  of available  working  hours,  per  year. 
Deflating  by the group  rate implies  that all variables  have linear  homo- 
geneous  effects  on individual  unemployment:  their  impact  is doubled  if the 
group  unemployment  rate  is doubled.18  Using  total  hours  of unemployment 
also  means  that  these  estimates  cannot  distinguish  unemployment  resulting 
from many short spells from that resulting  from one long spell, a topic 
that has been  the focus of so much  recent  work. 
As contrasted  with the official  BLS unemployment  statistic  represented 
in the denominator,  the sample  values  of hours  of unemployment  would  be 
inaccurate  for two offsetting  reasons.  On the one hand, the definition  of 
unemployment  is less strict than that in the CPS sample of households 
because  the respondent  did not have to indicate  the methods  he used in 
looking  for work.  On the other  hand, the respondent  was being asked  to 
recall  how  many  days  he was  unemployed  in the preceding  calendar  year,  a 
period  that ended  at least five months  earlier.  If he were  not unemployed 
at all, he would presumably  remember  that pretty  well. But if he were 
18. I have  tested  this assumption  by estimating  alternative  nonhomogeneous  forms of 
the equations.  The homogeneous  equations  both fit slightly  better  and have  slightly  more 
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unemployed,  he might understate  the time spent in this status,  and thus 
contribute  to an overall  underestimate.  Since the average  unemployment 
rates  computed  from  this  sample  are  approximately  the  same  as the  relevant 
group  rates,  and since  they might  be expected  to be larger  because  of the 
disproportionate  representation  of low-income  families  here, the second 
bias appears  to win out, resulting  in a second  source  of understatement  of 
total unemployment-one  that also appears  to be small. 
These  unemployment  figures  pose one other  problem.  Over  the first  five 
years  of the survey,  when  questionnaires  were  administered  in person  and 
asked for rather  detailed  information  on income and employment,  the 
gross unweighted  unemployment  rate computed  from the sample was 
approximately  equal  to the weighted  average  unemployment  rate of male 
and female  heads. In the sixth year, however,  when the survey  was con- 
ducted  by telephone  with  a much  briefer  income  and  employment  question- 
naire,  the sample  unemployment  rate was only two-thirds  of the rate for 
family  heads.  This  indicates  that  the telephone  may  itself  have  been  respon- 
sible for additional  measurement  error  and that the 1972  figures  must be 
used  cautiously. 
The  equation  estimates  are  reported  in Table  2. All three  equations  have 
the low R2 characteristic  of relationships  estimated  with microdata,  but 
the samples  are large  enough  that most independent  variables  are statis- 
tically  significant.'9  As predicted,  a dummy  variable  for 1972  was respon- 
sible  for a decline  in all three  relative  unemployment  rates  in that year. 
The coefficients  of variables  indicating  educational  attainment  and oc- 
cupational  status,  and  that  for race  among  females,  in most cases  have  the 
expected  signs  and are statistically  significant.  The one surprise  is that the 
middle-class  occupations-craftsmen,  operatives,  and  the like-often show 
an even  greater  cyclical  incidence  of unemployment  than  do the lower-class 
occupations-laborers,  service workers,  and farm workers.20  This fact 
becomes  important  in analyzing  the cyclical  incidence  of unemployment 
by permanent  income  status. 
19. Since unemployment  is a variable  that cannot go below zero, and since it is zero 
for most observations  in the sample,  these equations  should really be estimated  by the 
"Tobit"  procedure  suggested  by James  Tobin, "Estimation  of Relationships  for Limited 
Dependent  Variables,"  Econometrica,  Vol. 26 (January 1958), pp. 24-36. There are 
programs  for estimating  relationships  in this way, but I was unable  to get one operating 
in time for the conference. 
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Table  2. Coefficients  and  Statistics  for Individual  Unemployment  Rates, 
Working  Family  Heads  (Ui/Ug),a Pooled  Cross-section  Observations, 
1967-72b 
Family  head 
Independent  variable  and 
summary  statistic  White  male  Black male  Female 
Independent  variable 
Constant  -1.0197  (4.2)  0.0849 (0.3)  -0.4656  (1.6) 
No high schoolo  0.8931 (9.5)  0.2443 (2.0)  0.2698 (2.3) 
College  degreec  -0.0859  (0.7)  -0.3355  (1.0)  -0.2433  (1.0) 
Nonwhiteo  ...  ...  0.1795 (1.5) 
High-paying  occupationcd  -0.3496  (2.5)  -0.8884  (3.9)  -0.0205  (0.1) 
Medium-paying  occupationce  0.1449 (1.2)  -0.4162  (3.8)  0.2755 (2.2) 
Less than 25 years oldc  f  0.1759 (0.7)  0.0592 (0.3) 
Average  hourly  earnings 
(1967 dollars)  0.0376 (2.1)  0.0358 (1.2)  0.0225 (0.6) 
Asset income-needs  ratiog  f  f  f 
State unemployment  insurance 
coverage'  1.6556 (5.2)  0.9772 (2.5)  0.5836 (1.6) 
State welfare  program  for 
male-headed  familiesc  0.2484 (2.8)  f  ... 
State  monthly  public  assistance 
benefits  (1970 dollars)  f 
History  of frequent  job changec  1.4655 (14.7)  1.4074 (12.7)  1.1412 (10.5) 
Criminal  recordo  2.5167 (8.8)  f  0.7087 (1.4) 
Child needing carec  ...  ...  0.2225  (1.5) 
Not marriedo  0.2765 (1.7)  0.2317 (1.4)  ... 
1972c  -0.5216  (4.8)  -0.2610  (2.0)  -0.1861  (1.4) 
Summary  statistic 
R  2  0.068  0.058  0.058 
Standard  error  3.858  3.109  2.701 
Number  of observations  9,017  3,945  2,825 
Number  of observations  with 
some unemployment  1,074  785  396 
Source: Regression  results  using data from University of Michigan, Survey  Research Center, Panel Study 
of Income Dynamics. 
a.  il/Ug = ratio of the proportion of hours spent unemployed by an individual to the group unemploy- 
ment rate for that year. 
b. The numbers  in parentheses  are t-ratios. 
c.  The value of this variable is 1 if the respondent has the specified characteristic  and 0 otherwise. 
d. Includes professional, technical, and kindred workers; and managers, officials, and proprietors. 
e. Includes clerical  and sales workers; craftsmen, foremen, and kindred workers; and operatives. 
f.  Tried and rejected  because of statistical insignificance  or inappropriate  sign. 
g. Includes all monetary income of head and wife from assets and imputed rent on homeowner's equity, 
deflated by the poverty threshold for the family. 
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The coefficient  of age in these regressions  is much less than would be 
observed  in aggregate  statistics.  Most studies  indicate  that unemployment 
rates  for workers  aged 18  to 25 are  several  times  those  for older  workers  of 
the same sex and race, but these estimates  indicate  that among family 
heads  their  rates  are  barely  higher  for black  males and  females  and not at 
all different  for white  males.  Coefficients  for age cannot  be estimated  very 
precisely  in this sample  because  so few family  heads are under  25 (none 
were  under  18 in 1968  and, for the most part,  they have aged at the usual 
rate).21  Nonetheless,  they do indicate  that young  workers  who are family 
heads do not have nearly  the vulnerability  to unemployment  of young 
workers  without  family  responsibilities. 
The equations  also contain  two variables  from the labor-supply  litera- 
ture.  Higher  asset  income  relative  to needs,  a proxy  for nonlabor  wealth, 
did  not, as might  have  been  expected,  allow  people  to sustain  longer  periods 
of search  unemployment.  But  those  with  higher  real-wage  rates  did display 
slightly  higher  relative  unemployment  rates.  This association  could arise 
because,  other  things  equal,  higher-wage  workers  take longer  to find new 
jobs, or because,  as Hall has theorized,  higher  wages  compensate  workers 
for higher  probabilities  of unemployment  in certain  industries  (like con- 
struction)  and certain  cities  (like San Francisco).22 
21. Unfortunately,  a stronger  statement  cannot be made. One of the great problems 
of microdata  is response  or coding errors,  and these are present  in the Michigan  panel 
study data. The youngest  household  head in the sample, for example,  was 18 in 1968, 
19 in 1969,  20 in 1970,  and then he found the fountain  of youth, becoming  9 in 1971.  The 
fact that none of the observation  totals in Table 2 is divisible  by 6 indicates  that at least 
one family  head  changed  sexes  and another  one changed  races  during  the six-year  period. 
I also noticed  that one person  was unemployed  2,700 hours  in 1967  (term  it moonlighting 
unemployment),  another  worked  an average  of 100 hours  a week on his secold job, and 
still another was even more successful  at burning  the candle, or the calendar,  at both 
ends-he  worked  99 weeks  a year on his second  job. By checking  for outliers,  I was able 
to constrain  most of these  responses  to more  realistic  values,  but there  is no possible  way 
of eliminating  all such errors. 
22. See Hall, "Why  Is the Unemployment  Rate So High?"  and also, Robert E. Hall, 
"Turnover  in the Labor Force," BPEA (3:1972), pp. 709-56. The unemployment  re- 
gressions  in the appendix  to the first paper do not support  Hall's positive relationship 
between  wages  and  unemployment,  probably  because  he  includes  a series  of city dummies. 
When the wage was replaced with a  detrended  version (average hourly earnings 
deflated  by overall  wages instead of prices),  the equation was virtually  identical.  This 
means that variations  in wage rates, and not the trend growth, are responsible  for the 
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The next variable  refers  to the unemployment  insurance  program  of a 
worker's  state. Even though the programs  should be quite similar  from 
state  to state-all  states  provide  at least 50 percent  of previous  earnings 
up to a maximum  and the definitions  of covered  and uncovered  industries 
are standard-there is  a  surprisingly  large variation in  coverage. In 
Massachusetts  and California  the ratio of the covered  jobless rate to the 
total unemployment  rate  is 85 percent;  in Virginia  it is only 35 percent.23 
The variation  can be explained  partly by industrial  differences  among 
states;  partly  by varying  interpretations  of eligibility  (minimum  base earn- 
ings, minimum  number  of weeks and quarters  worked, initial waiting 
periods,  and maximum  duration  of benefits);  and no doubt partly  by the 
fact  that  state  policy  itself  may  be influenced  by the incidence  of unemploy- 
ment. If differences  in unemployment  insurance  coverage  are due to the 
first  two causes,  the positive  coefficients  in Table  2 confirm  a hypothesis, 
recently  advanced  by Feldstein,  that unemployment  insurance  does affect 
unemployment  rates.24  Under this interpretation  the average  unemploy- 
ment  rate  in Massachusetts  should  be higher  than  that  in Virginia  by about 
40 percent  of the national  rate, other  things  equal.  If, on the other hand, 
state  policy  is influenced  by the existence  or character  of unemployment  in 
that state,  the coefficients  are biased  upwards. 
Whatever  the case, the impact  of welfare  programs  on unemployment 
rates  is not nearly  so strong.  For male  heads,  a categorical  dummy  variable 
was included  to indicate  the twenty-three  states now having the unem- 
ployed-parent  segment  of the Aid to Families  with Dependent  Children 
program  (known  as AFDC-UP),  which  pays  benefits  to families  with  male 
heads  only  if the husband  works  less  than 100  hours  a month  (thus remain- 
ing unemployed  some part  of the time).  In these  states the unemployment 
rates  for white  male  heads  are  higher  than  the national  rate  by only about 
15 percent,  while  those for black male heads  are not at all higher.  More- 
over,  for  female  heads  the level  of public  assistance  benefits,  a proxy  for the 
23. See Nancy H. Teeters, "Built-in Flexibility of Federal Expenditures,"  BPEA 
(3 :1971),  pp. 621ff.,  for a discussion. 
24. See Feldstein,  "Economics  of the New Unemployment."  Some empirical  work on 
this topic reaching  similar  conclusions can be found in Arlene Holen and Stanley A. 
Horowitz,  "The Effect of Unemployment  Insurance  Laws and Administration  on Un- 
employment  Rates,"  Department  of Labor  Technical  Analysis  Paper  7 (U.S. Department 
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generosity  of the state's  AFDC program,  seems  to have  no impact  at all on 
unemployment. 
The final set of variables  corrects  for various  personal  characteristics 
that might  influence  an individual's  unemployment.  The most important 
of these  was  the degree  of job- or occupation-switching  during  the individ- 
ual's lifetime.  The strong  effect of this variable  is not surprising  since it 
would  be expected  to be closely  related  to abnormal  amounts  of unemploy- 
ment  and may not be a true  causal  variable.25  The only other  noteworthy 
finding  is that a criminal  record  makes  it harder  for white males to find 
employment,  but not for black males. Maybe blacks are already  treated 
as if they  had criminal  records. 
IMPLICATIONS  OF  THE  REGRESSION  RESULTS 
These  two sets of results  can  be combined  to relate  individual  unemploy- 
ment  to the aggregate  rate.  For each category  of age, race,  education,  and 
occupation,  I have simply used the equations  reported  in Table 2 to 
compute  the appropriate  UJ/U0,  holding  all other  variables  at their mean. 
Multiplying  by the relevant  estimate  of a  ULJ/d  U, from Table 1, gives an 
estimate  for a  Ui/d  U. 
The weighted average cyclical sensitivity of  unemployment  for all 
groups  in this sample  is about  0.9-indicating that  in terms  of percentage- 
point changes,  the unemployment  of family heads is less responsive  to 
changes  in the overall  rate  than  the unemployment  of nonheads.  Although 
this result  is consistent  with-indeed, controlled  by-the  time-series  rela- 
tionships  of Table 1, it may be somewhat  below the expected  level in this 
sample  with its disproportionate  representation  of low-income  families. 
The precise  degree  of understatement  cannot be estimated  without  some 
information  about  the response  of unemployment  of secondary  workers  to 
cyclical  movements.  However,  I have estimated  below that there  is about 
a 20 percent  understatement  of cyclical  losses in earnings. 
Even though the overall  response of unemployment  may be slightly 
understated,  the  distributional  patterns  should  still  be fairly  accurate.  Being 
25. The variable  was unity whenever  the person had changed  jobs more than twice 
during  the previous  five years  (as about 30 percent  of the regression  sample  had done). 
Since there  was a risk of simultaneous-equations  bias, I tried  alternative  equations  with 
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black  makes  a male family  head  much more  cyclically  sensitive  to unem- 
ployment  than  his white  counterpart-more  than doubly  so in most cate- 
gories-but has a much smaller  effect  for female  heads.  Age makes  little 
difference  for  family  heads  of any  category.  Invariably,  the  more  education, 
the less the incidence  of unemployment;  but higher  occupational  status 
does not necessarily  mean greater  immunity  to joblessness-at least as 
between  low- and middle-class  occupations. 
CYCLICAL UNEMPLOYMENT AND  PERMANENT  ECONOMIC  WELL-BEING 
These  results  have  identified  the incidence  of cyclical  unemployment  by 
race, education,  and occupation,  but not by family income. To do this 
requires  applying  the results to average  values of these categories  for 
families  at different  points in the income distribution.  In this section I 
perform  these  manipulations,  arraying  families  not by annual  income  but 
by a superior  measure,  which  I will term  their  permanent  economic  well- 
being. 
The  usual  standard  for measuring  distributional  influences  is the annual 
personal  income of families.  While this standard  may be adequate  for 
some  purposes,  it has  a number  of theoretical  and  practical  deficiencies  as a 
measure  of economic  well-being-at least some of which  are correctable. 
One of the more obvious is adjustment  for different  levels of necessary 
consumption  when  family  sizes differ.  Since  family  size has a slight  nega- 
tive correlation  with family personal income, distributional  statistics 
based  on gross  personal  income  somewhat  overstate  the equality  of distri- 
bution  of economic  well-being.26  This  deficiency  can be corrected  by divid- 
ing each  family's  income  by the federal  government's  poverty  standard  for 
a family of that size and location, hence expressing  income in terms of 
"needs"  units. 
A second  problem  is that family  income  is defined  on an annual  basis. 
Partly  because  of the well-known  transitory  component of income and 
partly  because  of an even  greater  variation  in the family's  needs  standard, 
the membership  of various  economic  classes is very fluid. In an average 
year  covered  by this  panel  survey,  almost  one-third  of those  in the poverty 
population  left it and almost as many entered  it. Over  the course of six 
26. This result comes from tabulations  of the panel survey data. Average need falls 
from about $4,400 (in 1970 dollars)  at the poverty  line to about $2,950  when income is 
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years  roughly  60 percent  of those  initially  listed  as poor became  nonpoor, 
with  their  places  taken  by others  who  initially  were  not poor.27  Though  the 
notion of chronic  poverty  is not as overstated  as the notion of chronic 
unemployment,  surprisingly  widespread  changes  in status  do take place  at 
the bottom end of the income  distribution. 
These  rapid  changes  in annual  income  mean  that computing  the income 
distribution  and counting  the numbers  of poor people  on the basis of one 
year's  income  would  understate  the  equality  of the  distribution  of economic 
well-being,  because  the lower-income  groups  in any one year would con- 
tain many  who suffered  transitory  declines.  A better  measure  therefore  is 
the average  ratio of income  to needs  for the entire  six-year  period.  When 
this is computed  the size of the "permanent"  poverty  population  is about 
12 percent  smaller  than average  levels  prevailing  in recent  years.28 
To return  to cyclical  unemployment,  the regressions  described  in Tables 
1 and  2 provide  estimates  of the sensitivity  of hours  unemployed  for groups 
of different  ages, educational  levels, occupations,  and so forth, to move- 
ments in the overall unemployment  rate. I  then constructed  six-year 
averages  of the family's  ratio of income  to needs, of the age, occupation, 
and wage rate of head, and of other  variables,  for all families  with con- 
tinuous data in the panel longitudinal  survey.  These values were then 
averaged  for all families  of different  types and classes of income-needs 
ratios  (white  families  with male heads and six-year  average  income-needs 
ratios  between  0 and  0.5, 0.5 and 1.0, 1.0  and 1.5,  and  so on). Applying  the 
unemployment-sensitivity  coefficients  of the upper panels of Table 3 to 
the average  age, education,  and occupation  of members  of various  classes 
of income-needs  ratios  gives the cyclical  sensitivity  of unemployment  by 
these  classes.  These  sensitivity  coefficients  are  presented  for average  income- 
needs  ratios  of 1.0,  3.0, and 5.0 in the bottom three  lines of Table  3.29 
27. See HEW, "The Changing  Economic  Status of 5000 American  Families,"  p. 11; 
and Kelly,  "Factors  Affecting  Poverty,"  p. 24. 
28. The weighted  annual poverty counts for the Panel Study of Income Dynamics 
are always  about 30 percent  below those based on the Current  Population  Survey.  This 
discrepancy  could be due  to the fact that the panel's  income  reporting  is better,  or it could 
be because  the sample  is smaller  and may have been biased  by attrition  to a degree  that 
even  weighting  cannot  correct.  The average  poverty  population  is then  another  12  percent 
below that measured  on an annual  basis  in the panel  survey,  or 40 percent  below the CPS 
total. See HEW, "Changing  Economic  Status,"  pp. 12-15. 
29. Since many are accustomed  to unemployment  rates expressed  in terms of male- 
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Table 3.  Response of Unemployment  Rate of Family Head to Movements 
in Overall Rate (aUg/9U), by Selected Characteristics  of Head 
Male  family head  Female  family head 
Characteristic  White  Black  White  Black 
Total  0.818  1.927  0.714  0.886 
Age of head 
Under  25  0.818  2.217  0.767  0.939 
Over  25  0.818  1.911  0.711  0.883 
Education  of head 
No high school degree  1.276  2.062  0.853  1.025 
High school degree  but no 
college degree  0.581  1.639  0.594  0.766 
College  degree  0.514  1.057  0.361  0.533 
Occupation  of head 
Low-paying  0.861  2.433  0.620  0.792 
Medium-paying  0.974  1.712  0.884  1.056 
High-paying  0.590  0.892  0.601  0. 77 
Average  family income 
Atpovertyline  1.311  2.140  0.704  0.948 
Three  times poverty  line  0.877  1.635  0.635  0.879 
Five times poverty  line  0.652  1.307  0.538  0.782 
Sources: Derived from regressions  in Tables 1 and 2. aUil/U  is calculated by multiplying aUi/lUg  from 
Table 2 by aUg/OU  from Table 1. The former responses are evaluated for 1967-71. 
For  all  groups,  sensitivity to  movements  in  the  unemployment rate 
declines with economic well-being, implying that high-income people are 
less susceptible to cyclical unemployment. They are not totally immune, 
however. The unemployment rate for poor white male heads is estimated 
to rise by  1.31 percentage points for a  1 percentage point change in the 
national rate-twice  the rise in  the unemployment rate experienced by 
white males with an average income of five times the needs standard  (about 
$22,500 in 1973 for a family of four). For black males the sensitivity at low 
income is about 1.6 times that at high income; for females it is even less 
than that. One force that holds down all ratios, as intimated above, is that 
medium-paying occupations generally display relatively large  swings in 
unemployment, and these occupations are heavily represented in  upper- 
Table  2 to present  the results  in terms  of these four family  types. All subsequent  calcula- 
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income classes. Further, for white males, a college degree seems to  in- 
fluence the sensitivity to unemployment only modestly. 
These results are also  presented graphically in  Figure  1. The  figure, 
which standardizes  the cyclical impact by putting it in terms of annual loss 
of working  hours due to a 1 percentage  point increase in the unemployment 
rate (everybody starts with 2,080 hours a  year), indicates that  (1)  the 
percentage  losses of working time decline with economic well-being for all 
three groups; and (2) at any level of well-being, families with male heads 
fare worse than those with female heads and families with black male heads 
worse than those with white male heads. The greater cyclical sensitivity of 
blacks to unemployment, relative to whites, is then due partly to the fact 
Figure 1. Annual  Loss in Working Hours of Family Head, by Color and 
Sex, Due to a 1 Percentage Point Increase in the Unemployment  Rate, 
by Six-Year Average of Family Income-Needs Ratio 
Annual  loss in head's  working  hours 
50 
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40. 
30- 
\  White  male\ 
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Ratio of family income  to needs, six-year  average 
Sources: Tables 1 and 2, and tabulations from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics, University of Michi- 
gan, Survey Research Center. 
Note:  Asterisk denotes mean income-needs ratio of the sample. 314  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1974 
that the whole schedule  is higher,  and partly  to the fact that mean black 
income  (denoted  on the figure  by an asterisk)  is lower. 
Other  Earned  Income 
The direct  unemployment  of family  heads  discussed  above accounts  for 
only one portion  of the loss in total work  hours  accompanying  any change 
in the overall  unemployment  rate.  In addition,  changes  occur  in the hours 
worked  by family  heads  who remain  employed,  and also in the labor  force 
participation  and hours  worked  by family  members  other  than the head. 
In this section  I consider  these effects. 
WORK  HOURS  OF  FAMILY  HEADS 
Up to now little work has been done on the distributional  impact of 
cyclical  losses in hours  worked  of workers  who remain  employed.  Time- 
series studies have focused on the aggregate  decline in average  hours 
worked,  while  cross-section  studies  of labor  supply  have  covered  only one 
year  and have not decomposed  the labor-supply  response  into changes  in 
hours and participation  rates. But Schweitzer  and Smith have recently 
completed  one paper which indirectly  addresses  this question.30  Using 
data from the same University  of Michigan  panel survey  of households, 
they fitted a cross-section  equation  explaining  hours worked  for family 
heads of various  demographic  types. One independent  variable  was the 
proportion  of the head's hours spent unemployed,  used as a proxy for 
induced cyclical declines  in hours. They find some negative impact of 
unemployment  in the current  year on hours  worked  and an even stronger 
impact of unemployment  lagged two years (unemployment  lagged one 
year had insignificant  effects).  The Schweitzer-Smith  results imply that 
hours  employed  (hours  in labor  force  less hours  unemployed)  decrease  by 
1.51  times  the increase  in hours  unemployed  for white  male  family  heads; 
by 1.33 times the hours unemployed  for black male heads, and by 1.25 
times  the hours  unemployed  for females.  The weighted  average  estimate  of 
1.40-a  reduction  in employed  manhours  of 40 percent  more than the 
30. Stuart  0.  Schweitzer  and Ralph E. Smith, "The Persistence  of the Discouraged 
Worker Effect," Industrial  and Labor Relations Review, Vol. 27 (January 1974), pp. 
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direct  reduction  due to unemployment-is  close to the aggregate  calcula- 
tion of Perry.3'  Although  the percentage  response  is larger  for white  male 
family  heads,  the absolute  change  in hours  worked  is roughly  the same  as 
for blacks  because  their  cyclical  movement  in hours  unemployed  is larger. 
SECONDARY  EARNINGS 
Two long-established  empirical  findings  bear  on the response  of secon- 
dary  earners  to swings  in the  head's  labor  income,  and  they  suggest  different 
results.  On the one hand, studies  of household  behavior  based on micro 
data have indicated  that wives and other secondary  earners  respond  to 
declines  in the  labor  income  of family  heads  by increasing  their  own  partici- 
pation and hours.32  At the same time, aggregate  time-series  studies  have 
reported  convincingly  that overall  labor force participation  and employ- 
ment rates  of youths  and females  respond  procyclically  to movements  in 
labor demand.33  The apparent  inconsistency  can be resolved  only if the 
participation  of members  of families  whose head does not become un- 
employed  decreases  enough  to offset  the increased  participation  in families 
whose  head  has become  unemployed. 
I have  tried  to deal  with  these  and related  questions  through  another  set 
of pooled  cross-section-time-series  regressions.  For simplicity,  these  regres- 
31. Perry,  "Labor  Force  Structure,"  p. 542. See also Gordon, "Welfare  Cost," p. 163. 
The specific equations used in these comparisons  came from Schweitzer  and Smith, 
"Discouraged  Worker,"  Table 5, p. 259. 
32. See Glen G. Cain and Harold W. Watts (eds.), Income Maintenance  and Labor 
Supply:  Econometric  Studies  (Markham  Press, 1973),  Chap.  9, for a convenient  summary 
of labor supply  results  for wives. A more thorough  discussion  of the question of wives' 
participation  can be found in Jacob Mincer, "Labor Force Participation  of Married 
Women," in Aspects of Labor  Economics,  A Conference  of the Universities-National 
Bureau  Committee  for Economic  Research  (Princeton  University  Press for the National 
Bureau  of Economic  Research,  1962); and Glen G. Cain, Married  Women  in thze  Labor 
Force: An Economic  Analysis  (University  of Chicago  Press, 1966). 
33. Perry, "Labor Force Structure,"  Appendix. Smith, using CPS gross-flow  data, 
advances  a very simple explanation  for this discouraged-worker  phenomenon:  unem- 
ployed people  are  more  likely  to drop out of the labor force, and there  are  more of them 
in a recession.  See Ralph E. Smith, "The Discouraged  Worker  in a FuU Employment 
Economy,"  in American  Statistical  Association,  Proceedings  of thle  Business  and  Economic 
Statistics Section, 1973 (1974), pp. 210-25. A contrary  view, which explains cycles in 
labor force participation  of females  in terms of real and relative  wage rates instead of 
unemployment,  is given  by Michael  L. Wachter,  "A Labor  Supply  Model for Secondary 
Workers,"  Review  of Economics  and Statistics, Vol. 54 (May 1972),  pp. 141-51. 316  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1974 
sions directly  explain  the total secondary  earnings  of the family,  without 
going  into the complex  interactions  between  participation  and hours  deci- 
sions of various  family members.  Another, and much more practical, 
reason  for explaining  earnings  is that good longitudinal  data on the be- 
havior  of secondary  earners  are unavailable;  the panel study contains  a 
complete  time series  only for the taxable  income  (labor  and asset  income 
combined)  of earners  other  than  the wife,  an incomplete  time  series  for the 
hours  worked  by these other  earners,  and no information  at all on their 
average  hourly  earnings. 
The form of the equations  is basically  that of a labor-supply  function, 
modified  to include  macroeconomic  influences  and to account  for the fact 
that the dependent  variable  is earnings  and not hours. The dependent 
variable  is scaled  by the family's  poverty  threshold  to adjust  for the time- 
series  effect  of increasing  price  levels  and  the cross-section  effect  of different 
family  sizes. The expected  negative  influence  of economic  conditions  on 
these  secondary  earnings  for both wives  and  teenagers  is represented  by the 
overall  unemployment  rate,  and the expected  positive  influence  of individ- 
ual unemployment  by the head's  loss of wage income due to unemploy- 
ment,  again  deflated  by needs.  The latter  term  is entered  quadratically  to 
see  if the  response  to the  head's  unemployment  is nonlinear.  The  sum  of the 
asset income of the family and the husband's  labor income, deflated  by 
needs, is used as another  variable  to capture  both the income effect of 
demand  for leisure  time and any other positive  correlation  between  hus- 
bands'  and  wives'  incomes.  A time  trend  accounts  for the  secular  increase  in 
the propensity  of women  to work over  the period.  A dummy  variable  for 
1972 is designed  to measure  any greater  underreporting  of secondary 
income  in 1972,  when  the survey  was  conducted  by telephone.  And finally, 
there is a set of family variables,  both demographic  (age, presence  of 
earners  besides  the wife, presence  of children  under  age 6) and economic 
(wage  rates,  state  unemployment  insurance  coverage). 
The equations  come out sensibly  in many, but not in all, respects  (see 
Table  4). That  for black  males  works  best, with  every  relevant  independent 
variable  working  well and a surprisingly  high (for micro  data)  R2 of 0.52. 
The  equation  for white  males  works  well  except  that  the direct  measures  of 
the wife's  real  wage  rate  and proxies  for it (occupational  dummies)  led to 
incorrect  signs  for the overall  unemployment  rate  and  hence  were  dropped 
from the equation.  No wage-rate  measures  are available  for secondary 
earners  (mainly  teenagers)  in families with female heads, but there the 
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Table 4.  Coefficients  and Statistics for Secondary Earnings-Needs  Ratio 
in Families with Working Head, Pooled Cross-section  Observations, 
1967-72a 
Family  head 
Independent  variable  and 
summary  statistic  White  male  Black male  Female 
Independent  variable 
Constant  1.5260 (10.0)  0.8860 (7.0)  -0.1559  (1.2) 
Aggregate  unemployment  rateb  -1.2080  (0.6)  -1.1408  (0.7)  e 
1972d  -0.0210  (0.6)  -0.0185  (0.7)  e 
Times  0.0234(1.7)  0.0230 (2.1)  e 
Ratio of asset plus labor 
income  to needsf  0.0204 (5.5)  0.1248 (19.8)  0.1058 (17.9) 
Ratio of loss in wages of 
head to needsg  0.0717 (1.6)  0.1415 (3.3)  0.2449 (4.6) 
Square  of ratio of loss in wages 
of head to needs  -0.0020  (1.8)  -0.0108  (2.7)  -0.0388  (4.4) 
Head's  age  -0.0420  (7.0)  -0.0412  (7.9)  -0.0054  (0.9) 
Square  of head's  age  0.0004 (6.3)  0.0005 (8.4)  0.0007 (1.2) 
Family  saving  equivalent  to 
2 months'  incomed  0.1843 (8.4)  0.0199 (1.2)  e 
Secondary  earners  other  than 
wifed  0.3486 (15.1)  0.2857 (16.1)  0.6591 (31.8) 
Child  needing  cared  -0.4125  (16.4)  -0.1211  (7.2)  e 
Wife  with higlh-paying 
occupationd  c  0.4184 (9.6)  ... 
Wife with medium-paying 
occupationd  e  0.2027 (9.2)  ... 
Nonwhited  ...  ...  0.1367 (5.7) 
Wife's  average  hourly  earnings 
(1967 dollars)  c  0.2557 (31.0)  .. 
State unemployment  insurance 
coverageh  -0.1334  (1.9)  -0.3333  (5.7)  -0.1171  (1.7) 
Summary  statistic 
,R2  0.089  0.519  0.339 
Standard  error  0.875  0.444  0.507 
Number  of observationsi  8,408  3,509  2,825 
Number  of observations  with 
some secondary  earnings  5,255  2,319  814 
Source: Basic data are from the source cited in Table 2. 
a. The numbers  in parentheses  are t-ratios. 
b.  Expressed  as a decimal. 
c.  Tried and rejected because of statistical insignificance, inappropriate sign, or inappropriate sign on 
some other variable. 
d. The value of this variable is 1 if the observation has the specified characteristic  and 0 otherwise. 
e.  1967 =  1, 1968 = 2,  .  .  .,  1972 =  6. 
f.  Asset income is defined as in Table 2, note g. 
g. Hours unemployed times money wage rate, deflated by poverty threshold. 
h. Ratio of state covered to total unemployment rate. 
i.  The number  for families with male heads is less than that in Table 2 because all nonmarried families 
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Beginning with the head's unemployment, the equations indicate that 
secondary earners do work somewhat more when the head becomes un- 
employed, but not very much: for families with male heads, extra efforts by 
secondary workers recover less than 3 percent of the drop in the head's 
earned income; for families with female heads, the figure is 11 percent. The 
quadratic  terms indicate statistically significant, but very slight, reductions 
in even this small response as the variable increases, probably because 
upper-income  families (whose wages are larger relative to their needs) feel 
less urgency about recovering the income loss. The coefficients for state 
unemployment insurance programs again have surprisingly strong effects 
on  reducing secondary earnings. The influence of  the business cycle is 
perceptible  but relatively  weak: a rise of 1 percentage point in the aggregate 
unemployment rate lowers secondary earnings in families with white male 
heads by 2 percent, in families with black male heads by 3 percent, and in 
families with female heads not at all. The weighted average of responses of 
secondary earnings of all three groups is about 70 percent of the income 
loss due to the direct unemployment of the family head, roughly the same 
as would be implied by Perry's aggregative calculations.34 
Those who are familiar with the labor-supply literature will notice many 
"unexpected" signs, each of  which can be rationalized in terms of  the 
peculiar nature of the dependent variable: First, the age quadratic shows 
that the response of secondary earnings to age rises with the age of the 
family head-because  as the head ages, the children do, and thus the wife 
is freer to go to work and the children become able to do so. Second, saving 
is associated with higher secondary earnings-because  it may be some sort 
of a proxy for the wage rate of the wife, and because the asset income of 
other earners unfortunately  cannot be expunged from the dependent vari- 
able. Third, secondary earnings are positively related to husband's labor 
income and asset income-because  the income elasticity of demand for 
leisure time is swamped by the fact that asset income may also be a proxy 
34. The judgment  that this response  is roughly  correct  arises  from the following rea- 
soning: Perry's  calculations,  conveniently  summarized  in Gordon's  Table 3 in "Welfare 
Cost" (p. 163),  indicate  that the loss of income due to lack of participation  is about half 
that due to direct  unemployment.  Although this is less than I find here, because  I treat 
the direct  unemployment  of secondary  workers  as a secondary  earnings  loss, my greater 
impact is reasonable.  My results also imply that certain groups, such as low-income 
families  headed  by males,  suffer  very  large  proportionate  declines  in secondary  earnings, 
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for the wife's wage rate, for past secondary earnings, and even for the 
impact of the business cycle. 
LOSSES IN  EARNED  INCOME  DUE  TO  HIGHER  UNEMPLOYMENT 
These influences can now be summarized by examining the impact of 
overall unemployment conditions on the earnings for families at different 
points in the distribution of permanent income. This impact can be deter- 
mined for each family type and each class of average income-needs ratios 
through the following model. 
(1)  Unemployment of head: 
208  -a1AU, 
where HU is the head's hours unemployed, and U is the overall unemploy- 
ment rate. Estimates of a,  for three values of the income-needs ratio are 
given in the last three lines of Table 3. 
(2)  Labor income of head: 
AHY=  a2L(W.  HU), 
where HY  is the head's labor income and  W is the six-year average of 
hourly earnings in the appropriate income-needs class. The scale factor 
a2 adjusts for the fact that hours unemployed lead to  even greater per- 
centage changes in hours worked. The Schweitzer-Smith estimates listed 
above are used for this coefficient. 
(3)  Secondary earnings: 
A SE=b  A HY 
+  b 
__  (  N  U)  b_  Au  ff  1  N  2  N  3 
where SE is total secondary earnings, and N is family needs. The bi coeffi- 
cients for  the three family types are those  listed in  Table 4:  b1 is  the 
coefficient for asset plus labor income relative to needs (since asset income 
is constant, the only relevant change is that in head's labor income); b2 is 
the coefficient for loss in wages relative to needs, with the quadratic effect 
included; and b3 is the coefficient for the aggregate unemployment rate. 
The results of these calculations are presented in Figure 2, in terms of 
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Figure 2.  Percentage Loss in Family Personal Income, Excluding Changes 
in Transfer  Payments, Due to a 1 Percentage Point Increase in the 
Unemployment  Rate, by Color and Sex of Head, and by Six-Year 
Average  of Family Income-Needs  Ratio 
Percentage  loss in  family personal  income 
5.0 
4.0  - 
Black  male 
3.0- 
2.0  -  White  male 
1.0 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
Ratio of  family income  to needs,  six-year  average 
Sources: Tables 1, 2, and 4, and tabulations from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics. 
Note:  Asterisk denotes mean income-needs ratio of the sample. 
point in the unemployment rate. Notice first that the overall average loss is 
1.2 percent, which is below most estimates of the cyclical impact of rising 
unemployment on  aggregate incomes.  The comparison is not  valid for 
two reasons, however. First, the cyclical estimate of a 2.7 percent decline 
in income accompanying every 1 point increase in the unemployment rate 
includes 0.9 point due to higher productivity, which goes either into cor- 
porate profits and dividends or higher wages for employed workers and is 
therefore above  and  beyond  the  relationships I  deal  with.  Once  this 
component is deducted, the cyclical decrease due to losses in manhours 
alone is  1.8 percent. Second, my  calculations are based on total family 
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income (transfer payments and income from assets). If the labor earnings 
of all working families were to decline by 1.8 percent due to losses in man- 
hours, in line with the aggregate calculations above, their family personal 
income  would  decline by  1.5 percent. Thus  the numbers presented in 
Figure 2 account for about 80 percent (1.2/1.5)  of the cyclical loss in in- 
come, with the understatement  being attributable to the various statistical 
problems mentioned earlier-explicit  and implicit attrition in the sample, 
measurement error in  recalling unemployment,  and  the  fact  that  the 
responses of secondary earnings estimated in Table 4 may be weaker than 
they should be. 
The distributional conclusions are much the same as those arising from 
Figure 1, where only the absolute loss in head's hours was measured. One 
important difference  is that the curve for families with female heads is now 
much flatter, because the labor income of poor families of this type is a 
small enough part of personal income that even sizable declines in hours 
worked induce only relatively small percentage declines in income.  In- 
creases in overall unemployment are now seen to result in slightly larger 
percentage losses of income for middle-income families with female heads 
than for either poor or rich ones. A second difference is that the disparity 
between the curves for white and black families at any income level has 
narrowed, partly because the percentage response in the head's work hours 
is greater at all income levels for whites, partly because the responses of 
secondary earners are quite similar. However, the labor income of families 
with black male heads still declines more than twice as much, in percentage 
terms, as that of families with white male heads because mean income is 
much lower for blacks.35 
Transfer  Payments 
Many have argued that business cycles are much less damaging to people 
now than in the past because of the rapid growth in governmental transfer 
programs. Others have argued that despite their growth, most  transfer 
programs are still not fully comprehensive and that many do  not even 
serve all who are eligible. Thus a systematic examination of whether trans- 
35. This finding  is borne out by the curves in Figure  1 and also by Richard  B. Free- 
man, "Changes  in the Labor Market  for Black Americans,  1948-72," BPEA  (1:1973), 
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fer programs  do in fact protect households against the damages of business 
cycles is in order. 
This section discusses the protection afforded by five different types of 
programs covered in the Panel Study of Income Dynamics: (1) unemploy- 
ment benefits; (2) AFDC  benefits; (3) the bonus value of food  stamps; 
(4)  the  portion  of  social  security that  benefits the  nonaged,  primarily 
payments to the disabled; (5) all other public and private transfer pay- 
ments, including private pension benefits, help from relatives, alimony, 
and child support.36  Using the Michigan data in regression analysis, I have 
estimated the aggregate responsiveness of the various transfers to changes 
in economic conditions. Since public transfers of all kinds have expanded 
markedly over the six-year period 1967-72, all the relationships are esti- 
mated only for 1971, the latest year in which complete data taken by per- 
sonal interview are available. Furthermore, because the  results pertain 
to the nonaged population, all families whose head was older than 65 were 
dropped from the sample. 
The main problem in using household data to describe transfer  programs 
is underreporting  of income. There are no statistics on the degree of under- 
reporting from the Panel Study of  Income Dynamics,  but the  Current 
Population Survey, which asks  similar questions,  finds these  reporting 
percentages:37 
Unemployment  benefits  66 
Public  assistance  benefits  (including  AFDC)  70 
Food stamp  benefits  80 
Social security  benefits  90 
The panel study percentages should be higher because the longitudinal 
nature of the survey should improve the quality of the information in the 
later years. Moreover, as is mentioned in note 28 above, standard defini- 
tions of income and family needs lead to somewhat higher incomes, and 
36. Private  transfers  are simply  exchanges  of money  within the household  sector  and 
would not normally be considered  transfers.  However, the Michigan panel data are 
recorded  in such a way that it is impossible  to distinguish  these payments  from other 
governmental  and business  transfer  payments. 
37. See Current  Population  Reports,  "Money  Income  in 1972  of Families  and Persons 
in the United States,"  Series  P-60, No. 90 (1973), p. 25. For food stamps  see The  Social 
and  Economic  Status  of the Black  Population  in the United  States, 1973, Series  P-23, No. 
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fewer  numbers  of poor  people,  at the bottom  of the distribution.  Neverthe- 
less, there  undoubtedly  remains  some underestimate  of transfer  responses 
due to underreporting. 
UNEMPLOYMENT  INSURANCE 
According  to Feldstein,  workers  who are covered by unemployment 
insurance  are covered  very well indeed-some with benefits  that exceed 
their  income  from their  work.38  To the extent  that this is true,  the unem- 
ployment  insurance  system  is so responsive  to declines  in labor  income  that 
workers  may  have  little  incentive  to find  jobs. At the same  time  unemploy- 
ment  insurance  does  not benefit  those  who work  in uncovered  occupations, 
those who have not worked  long enough  to qualify  for benefits,  or those 
who have been unemployed  for more  than the maximum  covered  twenty- 
six weeks  (thirty-nine  in a recession).  Moreover,  unemployment  insurance 
could be expected to provide little protection  against income declines 
resulting  from losses in overtime  hours  and secondary  earnings,  which  as 
noted  above  are  responsible  for  much  of the  loss  in  labor  income  for  families 
with male  heads. 
To know  how unemployment  benefits  respond  to losses  in earned  income 
requires  knowing  how they respond  to losses in wages  due to unemploy- 
ment,  and  then  how lost wages  are  related  to losses  in total earned  income. 
The first  relationship  is evaluated  through  a regression  of the form: 
(4)  =  co ?  cl (W  U)(SUIC) +  C2 (W  HU)(SUIC)() 
where  T1  stands  for unemployment  benefits,  SUIC  is the ratio  of covered  to 
total unemployment  rates  in the state, and Y is family  income excluding 
transfers  (HY +  SE +  asset  income),  or pretransfer  income.  The  equation 
allows  benefits  to respond  to lost wages  more,  the more comprehensive  is 
the state program,  and also in a nonlinear  way as income changes.  The 
coefficient  estimates  in Table 5 indicate  that for families  with male heads 
responsiveness  declines  as family income rises, while for families with 
female  heads  it increases  with family  income.  The response  of benefits  to 
38. The most complete  statement  of this position  can be found  in Martin  S. Feldstein, 
"Unemployment  Compensation:  Adverse Incentives  and Distributional Anomalies," 
National  Tax Journal, Vol. 27 (June 1974), pp. 231-44. 324  Brookings  Papers  on Economic  Activity,  2:1974 
wages lost due to  unemployment can be computed from this equation, 
evaluated at the mean of SUIC. To insure homogeneity, the relationship 
is transformed  as follows:39 
OT1  _  ___  coN  Y 
(5)  d(W* HU)  -  (W * HU)  (W ?  HU) +  cN(SUIC)  +  c2(SUIC)  N. 
Values for benefits relative to wages lost due to unemployment given by 
this technique are also shown in Table 5. They indicate that even though 
some people may be covered very well, the ratios of benefits to lost wages 
are only in the range from 24 percent to  13 percent (depending on the 
income-needs ratio) for families with male heads and from 23 percent to 
18 percent for families with female heads. These low percentages are attrib- 
utable both to the fact that many unemployed persons are not covered and 
to the fact that the ratios of benefits to lost wages are low even for those 
who are covered (see the last two lines of Table 5).40 
The second reason for incomplete protection by unemployment insur- 
ance is that it deals only with losses in labor income resulting from direct 
unemployment. The aggregate degree of cushioning can be obtained by 
multiplying the above relationship involving wages lost due to unemploy- 
ment by a factor indicating that direct unemployment is only one source 
of income loss, as is implicit in equations (2) and (3): 
(6)  ~  aTj  /  aTj  \a(W  HU)\ 
(6)  ~  ~~  dY =  at(W  HU)}  a Y  J 
The numbers resulting from these operations are even lower than those in 
Table 5. They are given in the first three rows of  Table 10, which sum- 
39. A neater way to insure homogeneity  would have been to estimate equation  (4) 
without  an intercept.  Whenever  I tried, however,  using forms where the equation  was 
multiplied  through  by N (with  co  0  O)  and another  form  where  it was divided  through  by 
(W * HU)/N, the coefficients  implied  predicted  benefits  below  averages  for the sample  by 
unreasonable  amounts.  My technique  basically  reproduces  sample averages  (see note c to 
Table 5), with slight differential  effects due to income and family size. 
40. All numbers  are understated  because  of the underreporting  of transfer  income.  By 
way of illustration,  sample  surveys  of unemployment  insurance  recipients  indicate  that in 
1969,  77 percent  of unemployed  adult  men and 57 percent  of unemployed  adult  women 
(nonheads  as well as heads)  drew  benefits.  See Gloria P. Green, "Measuring Total and 
State Insured  Unemployment,"  Mon2thlly  Labor  Review,  Vol. 94 (June 1971), p. 40. The 
coverage  figures in Table 5  thus seem about 30 percent low  for male family heads, 
roughly consistent with the underreporting  percentages listed above. However, even 
if Tl/(W.  HU) were increased  proportionately  to eliminate underreporting  bias, the 
basic conclusions  regarding  unemployment  insurance  would remain  true. Edward M. Gramlich  325 
Table 5.  Coefficients  and Statistics Showing Impact of Unemployment 
Insurance  Benefits in Relation to Needs, by Sex of Family Head, 1971a 
Family  head 
Descriptionb  Male  Female 
Independent  variable 
Constant  0.0121  (7.8)  0.0096  (2.6) 
(SUIC)  (W*  HU/N)  0.1901  (14.1)  0.0032  (0.1) 
(SUIC)  (W  HU/N)  (Y/N)  -0.0438  (12.1)  0.0366  (2.3) 
Suimmary  statistic 
R2  0.146  0.019 
Standard error  0.073  0.098 
Implied  value  of ratio  of unemployment 
benefits to (W  * HU),c by ratio of 
pretransfer  family income  to needs, 
Y/N 
1.0  0.240  0.231 
3.0  0.206  0.179 
5.0  0.127  0.204 
Beneficiaries  as a percent  of 
unemployed heads 
For  Y/N<1.J5  0.342  0.183 
For  Y/N  >  1.5  0.612  0.300 
Benefits  per recipient  as a proportion  of 
wages lost diue to uniemployment 
For  Y/N  <  1.5  0.649  0.650 
For  Y/N  >  1.5  0.317  0.352 
Source: Derived from data in the Panel Study of Income Dynamics for 1971. 
a. The numbers in parentheses  are t-ratios. 
b. SUIC  = ratio of covered to total unemployment rates in state 
W = average hourly earnings in the appropriate  income-needs class 
HU  = head's hours unemployed 
N  = family needs 
Y = pretransfer  family income. 
c.  In the text I describe  a procedure  for replacing  the marginal  coefficient  aTi/a( W-  HU) with the average 
Ti/( W HU) in computing the cushioning effect, where Ti is unemployment benefits. If this procedure had 
not been followed and only the marginal coefficients had been used, the cyclical cushioning impact of un- 
employment insurance would have been much smaller: the marginal coefficients would have been between 
0.10 and -0.02  for male-headed  families and between 0.03 and 0.13 for female-headed  families. The values 
shown here are much closer to the product of beneficiaries as a percent of the unemployed and benefits 
per recipient,  as a proportion of wages lost for the appropriate  income class, shown in the lower two panels 
of the table. 
marizes  the results  for the various transfer  programs  discussed  in this 
section.  Now unemployment  insurance  is seen to provide  only relatively 
minor  protection  against  cyclical  income  losses-between 6 and 8 percent 
of dollar  losses  in earned  income  for  families  with  male  heads,  and  between 326  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1974 
14  and 18  percent  for losses  in families  with  female  heads.  Families  headed 
by females  fare  better,  proportionately,  because  direct  unemployment  is a 
much  larger  component  of losses  in earnings. 
AID  TO  FAMILIES WITH  DEPENDENT  CHILDREN 
The  welfare  system,  formally  known  as Aid to Families  with Dependent 
Children,  has been  the subject  of so much  criticism  in the past  decade  that 
its defects  are  by now familiar.41  One of the most commonly  mentioned  is 
the fact that,  transfer  benefits  generally  decline  by $2  for every  $3  increase 
in earnings-in effect  a "tax"  rate  of 67 percent  on the change  in earnings. 
This  high  tax rate  has been  strongly  criticized  because  it reduces  incentives 
for families  to raise their incomes  by working  more hours; at the same 
time,  however,  it does protect  families  against  losses  in earned  income  that 
would  otherwise  result  from cyclical  swings  in labor demand. 
A second difficulty-this time working  to decrease  protection-is  the 
system's  incomplete  coverage:  some  families  headed  by females  with fairly 
low incomes  are not covered  if they reside  in certain  less generous  states; 
families  headed  by males  are  not covered  at all in twenty-seven  states;  and 
in the twenty-three  states that have the program  for families with male 
heads  (AFDC-UP), benefits  are paid only when the husband  works  less 
than 100 hours a month, has been unemployed  for 30 days, and is not 
eligible  for unemployment  insurance.  Even then, AFDC-UP shares  the 
characteristic  of unemployment  insurance  in cushioning  income declines 
resulting  from direct  unemployment  but not from other  sources. 
The larger  program,  for families  with female  heads,  works  much  like a 
negative  income  tax in the sense  that  benefits  are  paid  whenever  income  is 
low. I have thus estimated  cyclical  cushioning  by expressing  the ratio of 
benefit  payments  to needs  as a linear  function  of (a) the ratio  of pretransfer 
income  to needs,  and (b) state public  assistance  benefits,  with the sample 
limited  to those with pretransfer  income less than 1.5 times the poverty 
line. The results,  presented  in Table 6, reveal  the cushioning  effect  to be 
-0.196. 
41. A good survey  of these problems  can be found in Michael C. Barth, George J. 
Carcagno,  and John L. Palmer,  Toward  an Effective  Income  Support  System:  Problems, 
Prospects, and Choices (University of Wisconsin, Institute for Research on Poverty, 
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Table 6.  Coefficients  and Statistics Showing Impact of AFDC Benefits in 
Relation to Needs, Families with Female Heads and Income Less than 
1.5 Times the Poverty Line, 1971a 
Independent  variable  and  summary  statistic  Coefficient 
Independent  variable 
Constant  0.0641 (1.6) 
State public  assistance  benefits  0.0050 (6.5) 
Ratio of pretransfer  family  income to needs, 
Y/N  -0.1962  (7.2) 
Summary  statistic 
R 
2  0.193 
Standard  error  0.274 
Proportion  of families  receiving  benefits 
(percent)  36.4 
Average  benefit  per recipient  (dollars  per 
year)  2,479 
Source: Same as Table 5. 
a.  The numbers in parentheses  are t-ratios. 
Since the marginal  tax rate on earnings is 67 percent, it may seem surpris- 
ing that benefits increase by only 20 percent of the decline in earned in- 
come.  Several factors reconcile these two numbers, however. First, even 
though marginal tax rates are 67 percent, the existence of an earnings set- 
aside (the first $30 of monthly earnings are untaxed) and the deduction of 
work-related  expenses in computing benefit levels mean that actual average 
tax rates are much lower, possibly as low as 30 percent.42  Second, although 
the AFDC coverage, which rose rapidly in the sixties, is much more com- 
plete than that of  unemployment insurance, perhaps 20 percent of  the 
families with female heads whose  income  is  near the  poverty line  still 
receive no payments because of very low guarantee levels and other admin- 
istrative vagaries in some states.43  A final factor leading to a relatively in- 
42. See Barry  M. Blechman,  Edward  M. Gramlich,  and Robert W. Hartman,  Setting 
National  Priorities:  The  1975  Budget  (Brookings  Institution,  1974),  p. 183; and Robert  I. 
Lerman,  "Incentive  Effects  in Public Income Transfer  Programs,"  in Studies  in Public 
Welfare,  Paper  4, Income  Transfer  Programs:  How They  Tax the  Poor, Prepared  for the 
Use of the Subcommittee  on Fiscal Policy of the Joint Economic Committee,  93 Cong. 
1 sess. (1974), pp. 1-77. A convenient  graphical  summary  of how these tax rates work 
can be found in Irwin  Garfinkel  and Larry  L. Orr,  "Welfare  Policy and the Employment 
Rate of AFDC Mothers,"  National  Tax Journal,  Vol. 27 (June 1974),  p. 278. 
43. See Blechman  and others,  Setting  National  Priorities,  Table 7-6, p. 174. 328  Brookings  Papers  on Economic  Activity,  2:1974 
sensitive response of AFDC  payments to losses in earned income is that 
benefits are reduced if unearned income increases. Thus if unemployment 
insurance  benefits were to rise in response to a fall in labor income, AFDC 
benefits would increase less than they otherwise would. 
The welfare program for families headed by males operates more like 
unemployment insurance than  AFDC  does  for  female  heads,  because 
benefits are paid only when the man becomes unemployed. I attempted to 
estimate cushioning by fitting an equation similar to (4). The sample was 
limited to those living in the twenty-three AFDC-UP  states and having 
pretransfer  income less than 1.5 times the poverty line, thus allowing the 
nonlinear term in income to be eliminated. Even this simple form did not 
give the correct sign for the wage-loss term, however, and I was obliged to 
compare mean AFDC  benefits with mean wages lost  due to  unemploy- 
ment for those families with male heads whose pretransfer income was 
less than 1.5 times the poverty line. The resulting ratio was 0.424. That in 
turn is multiplied by the estimate of [O(W.  HU)]/d Y, which is -  0.292, used 
in equation (6) for low-income males. The final value of OT21/  Y, which is 
-0.125  (see Table 10), is greater than the comparable number for unem- 
ployment insurance, indicating that for low-income families, AFDC-UP 
provides a bigger cushion against lost  wages than does  unemployment 
insurance. 
To elaborate on this finding, the panel data indicate that average bene- 
fits per recipient are higher for  AFDC  than for  unemployment insur- 
ance while the proportion of recipients is about the same-about  35 percent 
of  poor families with an unemployed male head receive benefits under 
each program.44  But whereas for unemployment insurance these benefits 
make up for only 65 percent of wages lost by recipients, for AFDC  they 
represent 123 percent of the loss-obviously  a large incentive not to leave 
the welfare rolls by taking a job. The implied work disincentive becomes 
even greater once allowance is made for the fact that payroll and income 
tax payments must be made from wages but not from transfer payments; 
then net income during periods of unemployment may average as much as 
40 percent more than previous wage income for AFDC-UP  recipients. 
Whether or not Feldstein is right about the implied disincentives in the un- 
employment insurance program, his basic complaint seems highly justified 
44. Since no AFDC recipient  can claim unemployment  insurance,  this means that 
70 percent of unemployed  male heads of low income receive some transfer benefits, 
which  is to say that 30 percent  receive  none at all. Edward M. Gramlich  329 
in the case of AFDC-UP.  An obvious way to improve the program would 
be to broaden its coverage and cut its average benefits. 
FOOD  STAMPS 
Under the food stamp program, low-income families can buy coupons 
whose bonus value (over the cost to them) depends on their pretransfer 
income. Since benefits are based on income and since families are eligible 
to participate regardless of the sex of their head, this program is probably 
the nearest thing to a negative income tax in the United States today. In 
the past the program has existed only in certain counties (about 60 percent 
of the total) but recent legislation has expanded it to all counties in the 
United States. Even then, participation rates are very low: only 26 percent 
of  low-income families with male heads and 51 percent of  low-income 
families with female heads claimed benefits in  1971 according to the re- 
sponses in the Michigan sample. Apparently, many people do not  apply 
if they expect to be eligible for only a few months, or if the bonus value of 
their stamps is small; others do not apply because they are unaware of 
their eligibility. 
The equations showing the responsiveness of the food stamp program to 
income losses are given in Table 7. Again the function is a simple linear 
relation between the ratios of benefits, and income, to needs, with both a 
constant and a slope dummy indicating the proportion of  participating 
counties in the state of the sample member. Even when this proportion is 
set at one, as it should be under current law (and as it is in Table 10), the 
low participation rates hold the implied cushioning of food  stamps well 
below the implicit program tax rate of 30 percent. 
OTHER  TRANSFERS 
There are two other transfer programs, neither of which is confined to 
poor people but both of which show some response to declines in earned 
income. Six percent of the families in this sample headed by a male under 
age 65, and 17 percent of those headed by a female under age 65, receive 
social security transfers  under programs  that aid early retirees,  the disabled, 
and (for female heads) survivors. According to the coefficients reported in 
Table 8, these benefits are sensitive, if only very slightly, to  declines in 
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Table 7.  Coefficients  and Statistics Showing Impact of Food Stamp 
Bonus in Relation to Needs, Families with Income Less than 1.5 Times 
the Poverty Line, by Sex of Head, 1971a 
Family  head 
Independent  variable  and 
summary  statistic  Male  Female 
Independent  variable 
Constant  0.0144 (2.1)  0.0413 (5.3) 
Proportion  of participating  counties  in state  0.1017 (8.5)  0.0835 (6.9) 
Proportion  of participating  counties  times  ratio 
of pretransfer  family  income  to needs, YIN  -0.0768  (8.5)  -0.0823  (7.3) 
Summary  statistic 
R2  0.151  0.138 
Standard  error  0.070  0.079 
Proportion  of families  receiving  benefits 
(percent)  25.8  50.6 
Average  benefit  per recipient  (dollars  per 
year)  866  600 
Source: Same as Table 5. 
a. The numbers in parentheses  are t-ratios. 
Table 8.  Coefficients  and Statistics Showing Impact of Social Security 
Benefits in Relation to Needs, by Sex of Family Head, 1971a 
Family  head 
Independent  variable  and 
summary  statistic  Male  Female 
Independent  variable 
Constant  0.0601 (8.9)  0.1038 (7.3) 
Head disabledb  0.2458 (13.8)  0.0559 (2.0) 
Ratio of pretransfer  family  income to needs, 
YIN  -0.0139  (6.3)  -0.0138  (1.3) 
(Y/N)  0.0005 (3.9)  0.0001 (0.1) 
Summary  statistic 
R  2  0.117  0.020 
Standard  error  0.155  0.233 
Proportion  of families  receiving  benefits 
(percent)  5.5  16.8 
Average  benefit  per recipient  (dollars  per 
year)  1,957  1,862 
Source: Same as Table 5. 
a.  The numbers in parentheses  are t-ratios. 
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Table 9.  Coefficients  and Statistics Showing Impact of Other Transfersa 
in Relation to Needs, by Sex of Family Head, 1971b 
Family  head 
Independent  variable  and 
summary  statistic  Male  Female 
Independent  variable 
Constant  0.1530 (11.7)  0.3333 (13.8) 
Ratio of pretransfer  family  income to needs, 
YIN  -0.0271  (6.2)  -0.0795  (4.2) 
(YIN)2  0.0009 (3.8)  0.0007 (2.8) 
Summary  statistic 
R  2  0.019  0.029 
Standard  error  0.316  0.435 
Proportion  of families  receiving  other 
transfers  (percent)  18.2  49.0 
Average  benefit  per recipient  (dollars  per 
year)  1,818  1,777 
Source: Same as Table 5. 
a. Transfer programs other than unemployment insurance, AFDC, food stamps, and social security. 
b.  The numbers in parentheses  are t-ratios. 
A much  larger  number  of families-18 percent  of those with  male  heads 
and 49 percent  of those with female  heads-receive some miscellaneous 
transfers  either  from some other governmental  source,  a private  pension 
plan, or (mainly  for female  heads)  alimony  and child support.  In addition 
to being fairly large-they average  $1,800 a year for those who receive 
them-these transfers  are  somewhat  responsive  to losses  in earned  income, 
particularly  for families  with female  heads, as the coefficients  reported  in 
Table  9 suggest. 
SUMMARY 
Table 10 provides  a summary  of the results for the various transfer 
programs  that are  given  in detail  in Tables  5 through  9. For each program 
it shows  the sensitivity  of benefits  to declines  in earned  income  evaluated  at 
pretransfer  incomes  of one, three,  and five times the poverty  line for the 
two family  types. It also gives the overall  response  of transfer  payments, 
the sum  of the  five  individual  responses.  For low-income  families  headed  by 
females,  transfers  rise  by 56 cents  for every  dollar  that earned  income  de- 332  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1974 
Table 10. Sensitivity of Various Transfer  Programs to Loss in Earned 
Income  (aTjfay),  by Income-Needs  Class and Sex of Family Head, 1971 
Family  head 
Program  and ratio  of average  family 
income  to poverty  line  Male  Female 
Unemployment  insurance 
At poverty  line  -0.070  -0.185 
Three  times  -0.084  -0.143 
Five times  -0.059  -0.163 
Aid to Families  with  Dependent  Childreni 
At poverty  line  -0.125  -0.196 
Three  times  ...  ... 
Five times  ...  ... 
Food  stamp  boniuses 
At poverty  line  -0.077  -0.082 
Three  times  ...  ... 
Five times  ...  ... 
Social security  benefits 
At poverty  line  -0.013  -0.014 
Three  times  -0.013  -0.014 
Five times  -0.012  -0.013 
Other  transfer  payments 
At poverty  line  -0.026  -0.078 
Three  times  -0.024  -0.077 
Five times  -0.023  -0.076 
All transfer  paymenits  shown 
At poverty  line  -0.311  -0.555 
Three  times  -0.121  -0.234 
Five times  -0.094  -0.252 
Sources: Tables 5-9 and tabulations  from University of Michigan, Survey Research Center,  Panel Study of 
Income Dynamics for 1971. 
clines, thus providing a substantial cushion. Indeed, since these figures are 
based on transfer income, which may be underreported, and follow  the 
usual convention of being expressed in terms of personal income-which 
is to say, they do not allow for the fact that federal and state personal 
income taxes are assessed on  earned income but not  on transfers-the 
cushion might be as large as 80 percent. This degree of cushioning for poor 
families whose head is female may be about as great as is feasible, given 
the need to provide within the transfer system some incentive for working. 
Even the highest income group of families headed by  females gets a 25 Edward M. Gramlich  333 
percent cushion. But families with male heads  do  not  do  as well; their 
cushions range from 31 percent to 9 percent for the income groups con- 
sidered here. For one thing, programs other than AFDC,  which benefit 
all kinds of families, have less complete coverage than does AFDC,  which 
mostly benefits families headed by females. For  another, the important 
transfer programs are based  only  on  unemployment and  not  on  total 
losses in income from all sources. This perhaps is one good, if less familiar, 
rationale for replacing present income-support programs (AFDC-UP  and 
food stamps) with a universal negative income tax. 
CYCLICAL  INCOME  LOSSES 
The impact of transfer payments on the distribution of cyclical income 
losses can be derived by combining equation (4), as estimated for various 
transfers  in Table 10, with the magnitudes depicted in Figure 2. The results, 
which would then pertain to  1971, are given in Figure 3. Obviously, the 
curves have shifted down  relative to  Figure 2,  reflecting the  fact  that, 
through its savings on transfer programs, the government is  one  bene- 
ficiary of the cyclical increase in income. 
Of special note among the features of Figure 3 is the greater progressivity 
of the incidence line for families headed by females because of the greater 
responsiveness of transfer programs at low incomes. Now  poor families 
headed by females suffer losses in personal income of less than one-half of 
1 percent for each percentage point increase in the unemployment rate-a 
lower percentage decline than is suffered by  all but the highest income 
families with female heads. 
Families headed by males are not as fortunate. While transfer programs 
do respond to income losses more at low than at high incomes even for 
these families, this differential  has not eliminated the regressivity  of cyclical 
movements. Percentage declines in income are still two and one-half times 
as great at the poverty line as at five times the line, and four times as great 
as at the highest income level shown in the figure.  At least for these families, 
the  unpleasant distributional ramifications of  business  cycles  are  not 
much ameliorated by transfers. 
Finally, the weighted average income decline of 1.6 percent in Figure 3 
translates  to an increase in the poverty population on the order of 600,000 
people, or about 2 percent, for every percentage-point increase in the un- 334  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1974 
Figure  3. Percentage  Loss in Family  Personal  Income  Due to a 
1 Percentage  Point  Increase  in the Unemployment  Rate,  by Color  and 
Sex of Head and  by Six-Year  Average  of Family  Income-Needs 
Ratio,  1971 
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Sources: Tables 1, 2, 4, and 10, and tabulations from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics for 1971. 
Note:  Asterisk denotes mean income of the sample. 
employment  rate. This conclusion  is similar  to results  that might be ex- 
pected  from the reduced-form  studies,  described  above, if they were ex- 
tended  using  later  data.45  On the basis of data  on income  and  family  needs 
45. The only updated  version  of these studies  I am aware of is by Jonathan  P. Lane, 
"The Relationship  Between  Poverty  Incidence  and Economic  Growth-with  Projections 
of Poverty Incidence  to 1980" (U.S. Office of Economic Opportunity,  January  1972; 
processed). 
I should note, however,  that the results given here disagree  with those recently re- 
ported  by Thad  W. Mirer,  "The  Distributional  Impact  of the 1970  Recession,"  Review  of 
Economics  and Statistics, Vol. 55 (May 1973), pp. 214-24. Using the same Michigan 
longitudinal  panel  survey  data, Mirer  compared  actual 1970  income  for each family  with 
its predicted  income  if there  had been no recession,  derived  by extrapolating  the family's 
1967-69 income experience.  He found that lower-income  groups fared relatively  much 
better  in the 1970 recession,  actually  improving  their position absolutely  by fairly  large Edward  M. Gramlich  335 
for 1969, these results  imply that every percentage-point  increase  in the 
unemployment  rate  reduces  the  share  of aggregate  personal  income  received 
by those in the bottom  quintile  of the distribution  of income-needs  ratios 
(below 1.3)  from 5.30 percent  to 5.26 percent. 
Conclusion 
The calculations  reported  in this paper  suggest  that increases  in unem- 
ployment  are regressive  in their  incidence  for families  headed  by men but 
not for those  headed  by women.  If the unemployment  rate  were  to increase 
by 1 percentage  point,  families  headed  by males  with poverty-line  income 
would suffer  a loss in income of nearly 3 percent  due to direct unem- 
ployment,  declines in hours worked, and reduced secondary  earnings, 
while  those  at five  times  the poverty  line would  experience  income  declines 
of approximately  1 percent.  These numbers  do not suggest that high- 
income  people  escape  cyclical  declines  unscathed,  even when attention  is 
confined  to earned  income  and transfers;  but they do indicate  disparities 
that could  become  quite  wide in a substantial  cyclical  decline. 
For families  with  female  heads,  on the other  hand,  the impact  of cyclical 
movements  is actually  somewhat  heavier  on middle-  than  on lower-income 
families.  If the unemployment  rate were to rise by 1 percentage  point, 
incomes  would decline  less than 0.5 percent  at the poverty  line, slightly 
more  in the  middle-income  range,  and  about  the  same  amount  at the  highest 
income  level.  The impact  on females  is smaller  only  partly  because  of their 
lower  direct  susceptibility  to unemployment;  the  rest  of the  difference  arises 
because  labor  income  is a smaller  component  of total income  at the lower 
ranges,  because secondary  earnings  would inevitably  respond  less, and 
because  both public  and  private  transfer  programs  provide  greater  cyclical 
protection  for women. 
Race is a significant  element  in the impact of higher  unemployment. 
Families  headed  by black males  suffer  income  losses approximately  twice 
amounts.  Two possible  factors  could underlie  this surprising  finding:  (1) Mirer's  results 
show a sizable  growth  of transfer  payments  which,  in this period,  would have been  due in 
part to exogenous policy changes; and (2) if the low-income people in 1969 included 
many  who were  temporarily  poor,  their  1967-69  growth  rates  would  be drastically  under- 
stated and they would tend to look better  even in a recession  year like 1970. 336  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1974 
as great  as those experienced  by families  headed  by white males. Part of 
this disparity  is due to the fact that families  with black male heads fare 
worse  than  whites  of the same  income  level;  but of greater  consequence  is 
the  generally  lower  incomes  of blacks  and  thus  their  greater  vulnerability  to 
the regressivity  of cyclical  movements.  For families  with  female  heads  the 
black-white  differences  are much less pronounced  because  differences  at 
any income  level are smaller  and because  those with low incomes  do not 
suffer  proportionately  greater  income  losses  than  those  with  high  incomes. 
For all types  of families,  the direct  unemployment  of the family  head  is 
obviously  an important  component  of the decline  in income,  but it does 
not tell  the  whole  story.  Hours  worked  by family  heads  fall 40 percent  more 
than  can be attributed  to direct  unemployment,  and declines  in secondary 
earnings  are  responsible  for losses  in income  of similar  magnitudes.  On the 
other  side, transfer  programs  are effective  in replacing  cyclical losses in 
earned  income  for some groups  but not for others.  For every  one-dollar 
decline  in earned  income,  transfer  benefits  rise  by 9 cents  for high-income 
families  with  male  heads,  31 cents  for low-income  families  with  male  heads, 
and 56 cents  for low-income  families  with female  heads. 
Thus, while unemployment  does hit low-income  families  harder  than 
high-income  families,  this finding  is not true  for all family  types and may 
not be inevitable.  Efforts  to improve  the coverage  of transfer  programs  for 
low-income  families  with  male  heads,  specifically  by basing  payments  more 
on income  losses  in general  and less on unemployment,  would  eliminate  a 
large  portion  of the adverse  distributional  effects  of high unemployment, 
and have the additional  benefit  of preventing  black-white  income  dispar- 
ities  from  widening  when  labor  demand  slackens. 
It should  be emphasized,  however,  that  the relationships  dealt  with  here 
represent  only the relatively  straightforward  equity  implications  of higher 
unemployment.  By confining  the analysis  to different  income groups, I 
have ignored  the serious  equity  implications  of the fact that within any 
income  class, some workers  are consigned  to involuntary  unemployment 
and some are not. A further  problem  is that even those who remain  em- 
ployed  may  lose wage  income  and  the opportunity  for a better  job as over- 
all labor demand  slackens.  Offsetting  these considerations  are the distri- 
butional  implications  of unanticipated  inflation.  Any complete  comparison 
should  consider  all costs and benefits  for various  people, which go well 
beyond  the implications  of cyclical  movements  discussed  in this paper. 